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Abstract 
The recent symbolic affirmation of Szeklerland as a new region in Europe marks the deep 
change in the pattern of relations between ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians in 
Transylvania. With the expansion of ethnic Hungarian cultural minority rights at their very 
limits during Romania’s post-communist transition, the autonomy for Szeklerland is a step 
forward from cultural to territorial collective rights. Facing the strong opposition of ethnic 
Romanian parties to the reshaping of the territorial design along ethnic lines, ethnic 
Hungarian elites adopted a growing symbolic mechanism of identity promotion. The 
mechanism of ethnic symbolism unraveled by the article ranges from road signs and 
signboards marking the entry into Szeklerland, the presence of Szekler flag and coat of arms, 
commemorations and other public gatherings to organizing an unofficial referendum for the 
autonomy of the region. The symbolic affirmation of the region marks its entry in the list of 
symbolically disputed territories and the birth of a new region in Europe. 
 
Keywords: identity promotion, regionalism, ethnic autonomy, symbolic nationalism, 
Transylvania, Romania. 
 
 
The post-communist debate on regionalization in Romania, although it did not 
lead yet to a concrete transformation of the regional administration, could be  
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considered as an incipient tentative of reshaping the regional design. The process of 
slow decentralization and the subsequent proposals for further regionalization define  
the transition from the centralized model of state to the more flexible, decentralized 
form of state administration. However, the failed political negotiations for creating 
effective, efficient administrative regions and for widening regional autonomy is to be 
seen as a long-lasting status-quo in redefining regional administration. The failure of 
regionalization encompasses numerous political, social and economic factors. One has 
to notice that the Romanian post-communist central government inherited a long-
lasting tradition of territorial equilibration and feared to adopt a stronger 
regionalization that could trigger an uncontrolled process of economic and social 
divergence. Such a process could have only added to the free market subsequent 
effects, which are reflected by the increasing territorial disparities.
1
 But another factor 
seems to weight significantly more than others. This is the ethnic factor, namely the 
existence of a significant ethnic Hungarian minority living in Transylvania, and more 
especially in several counties in Eastern Transylvania. The separate identity of a region 
called ‘Szeklerland’, inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, as well as its active promotion by 
ethnic Hungarian political elites turns the issue of this region into a serious obstacle for 
deepening regional autonomy and for making consistent steps towards functional 
regionalization.
2
 
The case-study selected here emphasizes the mechanism of symbolic 
nationalism put in place by both ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians when 
dealing with the affirmation of a new region in Romania. As underlined below, 
this is not about a new region in terms of historical existence, but in terms of 
promotion as a regular administrative regional unit in Romania during the 
ongoing syncopated regionalization process. By its nature, the case-study is 
limited in scope and cannot support generalization. However, the case of the 
symbolic affirmation of this region is much telling about both underlying 
mechanisms of symbolic nationalism and about the shift between practical, 
functioning politics and symbolic politics. Only when the limits of expanding 
minority cultural and linguistic rights have been reached, the issue of 
Szeklerland has emerged. Moreover, in front of the political deadlock on 
regionalization, normal current politics based on party negotiations turned into 
symbolic interaction. For fully understanding the case presented here, the 
promotion of Szeklerland as a distinct region has to be compared with other 
                                               
1  Dragoș Dragoman, “Regional Inequalities, Decentralization and the Performance of Local 
Governments in Post-Communist Romania,” Local Government Studies 37, no. 6 (2011): 
647-669. 
2  Dragoș Dragoman, Sabina-Adina Luca and Bogdan Gheorghiţă, “In Defence of Local 
Identity: Cultural Factors and Actors’ Strategy During Regionalization in Romania,” 
Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review XVI, no. 3 (2016): 331-356. 
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cases of symbolic geography, as it stands for Wales, Northern Ireland, Quebec 
or Catalonia.
3
 
On the one hand, following the collapse of the communist regime, ethnic 
Hungarian elites have constantly pushed for expanding minority rights. With the 
willingness of the Romanian state for quick access to various European 
organizations as the Council of Europe, NATO and the EU, expanding minority 
rights successfully accompanied the broader process of democratization and 
Europeanization.
4
 Although accepting high standards for minority rights, 
Romania constantly refused to accept regional autonomy on ethnic grounds. 
This was in line with the tradition set up by the modernizing and state-building 
processes which began in the 19
th
 century, when the French model of unitary 
state was adopted by the Romanian political elites.
5
 The current dead-lock 
regarding regionalization could be seen, in fact, as the ultimate confrontation of 
two parallel logics embraced by ethnic Hungarian and ethnic Romanian elites. 
For ethnic Hungarian political elites, the territorial autonomy of the region 
inhabited in large shares by ethnic Hungarians, which is referred to with the 
historical denomination of ‘Szeklerland’, is to be seen as the fulfillment of the 
largest expectations publically exposed by those elites during the post-
communist transition, that is expanding minority rights on its very limits. 
Territorial autonomy would thus work as the strongest guarantee for minority 
rights, with no need for constant and uncertain bargaining between ethnic 
Hungarian and Romanian parties on the minority rights issue.
6
 
On the other hand, territorial autonomy on ethnic grounds works against 
the ideal of the Romanian national unitary state, as it was conceived following 
                                               
3  Rhys Jones and Luke Desforges, “Localities and the reproduction of Welsh nationalism”, 
Political Geography 22, no. 3 (2003): 271-292; Carol Schmid, Brigita Zepa and Arta 
Snipe, “Language Policy and Ethnic Tensions in Quebec and Latvia,” International 
Journal of Comparative Sociology 45, nos. 3-4 (2004): 231-252; Brian Graham, Catherine 
Nash, “A shared future: territoriality, pluralism and public policy in Northern Ireland,” 
Political Geography 25, no. 3 (2006): 253-278; John Nagle, “The right to Belfast City 
Centre: From ethnocracy to liberal multiculturalism?” Political Geography 28, no. 2 
(2009): 132-141. 
4  Melanie H. Ram, “Romania: from laggard to leader?” In Minority Rights in Central and 
Eastern Europe, ed. Bernd Rechel (London: Routledge, 2009), 180-194; Dragoman 
Dragoman, “Language Planning and the Issue of Minority Languages in Romania: from 
Exclusion to Reasonable Compromises,” Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science 
Review XVIII, no. 1 (2018): 121-140. 
5  Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation-Building and 
Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
6  Dan Chiribucă and Tivadar Magyari, “The Impact of Minority Participation in Romanian 
Government,” In A New Balance: Democracy and Minorities in Post-Communist Europe, 
ed. Monica Robotin and Levente Salat (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2003), 73-97; 
Mihaela Mihailescu, “The Politics of Minimal “‘Consensus’. Interethnic Opposition 
Coalitions in Post-Communist Romania (1990-96) and Slovakia (1990-98),” East 
European Politics and Societies 22, no.3 (2008): 553-594. 
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the Peace Treaties in Paris at the end of World War One. A special status for an 
autonomous region inhabited in large shares by ethnic Hungarians would 
contradict the official definition of Romania as national state and would deny 
the long lasting nation-building efforts made by the Romanian elites.
7
 This 
denial would be at odds with the centennial celebrations that have been in place 
in 2018, when Romania celebrated one hundred years since the unification of all 
political territories inhabited by ethnic Romanians. The 1918 union of all ethnic 
Romanians under the umbrella of an independent and unitary Romanian 
national state is to be seen as the greatest political, social and military 
achievement and the outcome of a tremendous effort made by ethnic Romanian 
elites beginning with the 1848 revolution. 
Since post-communist political action in changing the regional design is 
locked by consistent ethnic tensions, the escape routes for those tensions have 
recently build up the framework of a growing symbolic conflict between ethnic 
Hungarians and ethnic Romanians in Transylvania. One of the most sensitive 
issues at stake is the Szeklerland region, whose name and borders remind about 
the medieval counties (seats) inhabited by Szeklers (known then as Terra 
Siculorum in Latin). Those seats have been in place from the 14
th
 century until 
1876, when the Hungarian government decided to re-design regional 
administration in Hungary and to replace Szeklers seats and other local 
traditional regional units with modern counties, inspired by the French 
territorial design model. The historical Szeklerland engulfs entirely the current 
Harghita and Covasna counties and part of the Mureș county in Eastern 
Transylvania (see Figure 1). It covers an area of almost 12,500 square 
kilometers, mainly in the mountainous regions of Eastern Carpathians.
8
 
 
 
Symbolic Nationalism and Regional Identity 
 
Studying the current affirmation of Szeklerland as a distinct region, it 
means inquiring about the mechanisms of symbolic nationalism. The symbolic 
nationalism that is referred to is to be conceived as opposed to overt, violent 
nationalism marked by open conflict and bloodshed. Although this kind of 
violent nationalism was largely present in the region, the current situation points 
toward a softer nationalism. This is a rather banal nationalism,
9
 based on 
                                               
7  Keith Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
8  Józef Benedek and Hunor Bajtalan, “Recent Regionalization Discourses and Projects in 
Romania with Special Focus on the Székelyland,” Transylvanian Review of 
Administrative Sciences 44 (2015): 23-41. 
9  Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995). 
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symbolic interactions, rather than on violent confrontation.
10
 Despite its obvious 
and sometimes aggressive manifestation, the logic of symbolic nationalism is to 
promote group identity and, in the same time, accept the presence of the other 
groups, as a necessary “other”. Therefore, the mechanism underlined here is the 
way ethnic groups define each other by contrast, by ethnic characteristics, in-
group interactions and out-group prejudice, namely by drawing virtual 
boundaries between groups.
11
 This is why the article focuses on the way ethnic 
elites build the imaginary of a region, how they help ethnicity manifest its 
presence and how they claim the primacy over the territory by using identity 
markers ranging from commemorations to road signs and flags. The use of 
ethnic identity markers strengthens the contrast between Szeklerland and the 
rest of the country, in terms of regional identity, thus emphasizing the symbolic 
birth of a new region in Europe. Therefore, the article takes into account both 
Hungarian and Romanian ethnic elites’ public standpoints on the matter, trying 
to unravel the mechanisms of the symbolic conflict over Szeklerland. It 
analyses the promotion of a peculiar identity and the designing of defining 
borders, which turn Szeklerland into an imagined community. 
Ethno-symbolism and symbolic politics, which is the practical 
transposition of ethnic categories in repertories for action, work with symbols in 
an effort of marking territorial boundaries and dominating the public space. In 
fact, this is a mechanism of differentiation and power building,
12
 which helps 
both ethnic dominance and strengthening ethnic groups’ identity.
13
 Ethnic 
groups finally end by functioning as practical categories, classification schemes 
and cognitive frameworks, as put by Brubaker, by reflecting each other and 
helping each other inner strength.
14
 In our case-study, by the way of 
commemorations, anthems, flags and other symbols, symbolic politics is a 
common feature in affirming ethnic and national identity.
15
 As other ethnic 
identities affirmed, Szeklerland is in the same time an effort of consolidating an 
imagined community, in the very sense invoked by Anderson.
16
 
                                               
10  Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1994). 
11  Fredrick Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 
1969). 
12  Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (London: 
Routledge, 1984). 
13  Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in 
Social Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1979). 
14  Rogers Brubaker, “Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical 
Category, Contingent Event,” Contention 4, no. 1 (1994): 3-14. 
15  John R. Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
16  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 
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Ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania: 
the Fluctuating Regional Borders 
 
During the Middle Ages, Hungarians in East Central Europe have been 
politically organized in the framework of a solid and powerful kingdom. With 
the rise of the Ottoman Empire, Hungarian statehood was put on a hold 
following the crushing defeat from 1526, which led to the dismantling of the 
Hungarian medieval state. Since then, the Hungarian history is marked by 
various efforts to regain and consolidate statehood. After 1526, the autonomous 
principality of Transylvania become the shelter of the Hungarian nation. 
Although subject to political dependency towards the Ottoman empire, 
Transylvania was never colonized by the Turks, as it happened to other parts of 
Hungary. It was there that the Hungarian nobility managed to keep alive the 
national, political and cultural heritage of the former medieval state.
17
 
The medieval institutional architecture and the legitimate authority of the 
Hungarian nobility in Transylvania was consolidated by the political agreement 
from 1437 (known as the Unio Trium Nationum, the union of the three estates) 
between the Hungarian landlords and the Catholic clergy, on the one side, and 
the other Estates of Transylvania (medieval états), namely the Saxons (szászok 
in Hungarian and sași in Romanian) and the Szeklers (székelyek in Hungarian 
and secui in Romanian), on the other hand. The union of these estates was 
directed against the peasantry,
18
 largely formed of Romanian peasants of 
Orthodox faith, who rebelled the very year. Both Saxons and Szeklers have 
benefited since the 12
th
 century from extensive autonomy grated by the 
Hungarian kings in exchange of solid defense of the kingdom’s Eastern borders. 
Saxons were primarily urban settlers of German origin coming from the 
Western European regions of Rhine and Mosel and founded numerous towns in 
South-Eastern Transylvania.
19
 The Szeklers, who are a subgroup of the 
Hungarian people, were at that time mostly free warriors and guards of the 
kingdom’s borders. The medieval autonomy of both Saxons and Szeklers ended 
with the social and political reforms promoted during the Enlightenment by the 
Austrian emperor Joseph II, who revoked Unio Trium Nationum as the the 
expression of an obsolete social and political order and promoted inclusive 
                                               
17  Paul Lendvai, The Hungarians: A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2003). 
18  Jean W. Sedlar, East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, 1000-1500 (Seattle, WA: 
University of Washington Press, 1994), 404. 
19  Harald Roth, Kleine Geschichte Siebenbürgens (Cologne: Böhlau, 2003). 
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citizenship for all inhabitants.
20
 Until then, both Saxons and Szeklers enjoyed 
extensive administrative, judicial and fiscal rights in the framework of distinct 
political structures which ruled autonomous territories, called Universitas 
Saxonum (Saxon community) and Székelyföld (Székelyland or Szeklerland, the 
label we prefer here). The existence of the medieval autonomous region of 
Székelyföld is still present in the imaginary of ethnic Hungarians in 
Transylvania, influencing how ethnic Hungarian elected officials conceive the 
relationship with the Romanian unitary state. 
After the defeat of the Ottoman Turks by the Habsburgs at the end of the 
17
th
 century, Hungary became part of the Austrian Empire. With the awakening 
of modern national identities, Hungarians fought the Habsburgs in order to 
establish a Hungarian national state.
21
 Although the 1848-1849 civil war ended 
in defeat for Hungarians, the persistent ethnic and political tensions finally led 
to the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867. By this, Hungary turned from a 
province of the empire into a pillar of the dual monarchy and the Hungarian 
government turned into a strong national government, eager to adopt measures 
prone to lead to the cultural homogenization of the territory. The struggle to 
culturally unify the Hungarian territory triggered the defensive response of 
Romanian ethnic elites in Transylvania. They strongly affirmed the cultural and 
political rights of ethnic Romanians, who formed the majority of Transylvania’s 
population.
22
 Despite all difficulties in promoting their cultural and political 
rights, the Romanian ethnic elites remained faithful to the Habsburg monarchy. 
It was only following World War One and the military defeat of Austria-
Hungary that Romanian elites turned towards the neighboring Romanian state 
and proclaimed the secession from Hungary and the subsequent unification of 
Transylvania with the Kingdom of Romania on the 1
st
 of December 1918. 
In fact, the most important political event of the 20
th
 century for Romania is 
the 1918 regrouping of all the territories inhabited by ethnic Romanians in a single, 
unified and unitary state. Modern Romania was born earlier in 1859, by binding 
together two provinces inhabited by ethnic Romanians, namely Wallachia and 
Moldova. With the 1877 independence from the Turkish rule, the new state was 
given recognition by the Peace congress in Berlin under the name of Romania and 
soon became a political actor in the South East European region. Following World 
War One, Romania engulfed other provinces, like Bessarabia, Bukovina and 
Transylvania. Although those provinces were previously part of multinational 
Tsarist and Habsburg empires, they were largely inhabited by ethnic Romanians. In 
                                               
20  Angelika Schaser, Josephinische Reformen und sozialer Wandel in Siebenbürgen. Die 
Bedeutung des Konzivilitätsreskriptes für Hermannstadt (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1989). 
21  István Deák, The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). 
22  Keith Hitchins, The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
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the changing European balance of power at the end of the war, Romanian cultural 
and political elites seized the opportunity and pushed for the unification of their 
provinces with modern Romania. This political move was the outcome of a long-
lasting effort for national unity.
23
 
However, the unification of the Romanian territories did not solve ethnic 
problems in the region. Although Romania was defined as unitary and national 
state, the new provinces brought in large ethnic and religious minorities, with 
their more urbanized, active and organized elites.
24
 The struggle to culturally 
homogenize the nation and to unify the national territory led to harsh nationalist 
policies and finally, to the rise of a violent right-wing, xenophobic and 
authoritarian movement.
25
 Ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania become 
one of the most important ethnic minority groups in Romania. Their inclusion 
within the new Romanian borders as a consequence of the political negotiations 
at the end of World War One turned their status from the dominant titular nation 
of the Hungarian state before 1918 to that of an ethnic minority in a neighboring 
country, in Romania. Transformed into an ethnic diaspora, although living very 
close to their kin-state borders, ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania constantly 
feared a slow and painful assimilation.
26
 
This fear of assimilation was in contrast to that expressed by ethnic 
Romanian political elites, who feared the strengthening of a minority group that 
would eventually lead to insubordination and even secession. This scenario 
happened when the European and regional context turned unfavorable. At the 
beginning of the Second World War, the Hungarian state claimed its right to 
decide the fate of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and attached half of the 
province in 1940, by using the second Vienna Award that followed the secret 
protocol of the Non-Aggression Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union. This geopolitical move was possible despite the fact that both Hungary 
and Romania were allies of Nazi Germany.
27
 The territorial loss was short-
lived, since the lost half of the province was recovered by Romania in 1944 and 
the border assigned by the 1920 Peace Treaty with Hungary was reconfirmed by 
the Paris Peace Treaties from 1947. The impact of this secession on ethnic 
Romanian elites’ sensibility was however very important. 
The fear of insubordination and secession is still visible later on, in the way 
the late communist regime tried to keep ethnic minority groups under tight 
                                               
23  Hitchins, The Rumanian National Movement. 
24  Livezeanu, Cultural Politics. 
25  Leon Volovici, Nationalist Ideology and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Romanian 
Intellectuals in the 1930s (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991). 
26  Elemér Illyés, National Minorities in Romania: Change in Transylvania (Boulder, CO: 
East European Monographs, 1982). 
27  Dennis Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally. Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940-
1944 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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demographic, administrative and cultural control by forging a combined socialist 
and Romanian nationalist ideology.
28
 Although the very first years of the 
communist regime represented a period of fraternity between the Hungarian and 
Romanian workers and peasants, the Ceausescu regime slowly turned 
internationalist socialism into national communism. Whereas an Autonomous 
Hungarian Region inhabited by large shares of ethnic Hungarians, engulfing the 
historical Szeklerland, was put in place in Transylvania in 1952 under Soviet 
guidance,
29
 the region was dismantled in the aftermath of the Hungarian anti-
communist uprising from 1956. The communist central authorities in Romania 
took then the opportunity to reshape regional design and more tightly control 
ethnic minorities, renewing the more traditional effort of nation-building from the 
inter-war period. Beginning with 1968, the territory was homogenously divided 
into 41 counties (județe), which are still in place today. The territory once covered 
by the autonomous Hungarian region in Transylvania was divided into the current 
Harghita, Covasna and Mureș counties, as shown in the Figure 1. 
Following the fall of the communist regime, the desire expressed by 
ethnic Hungarians to obtain autonomy on various levels was taken as a serious 
threat by ethnic Romanians. Ethnic clashes in Târgu-Mureș, a medium-size 
town from Transylvania, could have led to open ethnic conflict in March 1990, 
putting Romania on the European map of the post-communist violent ethnic 
conflicts well before former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union. Although 
open ethnic conflict was avoided by the decisive involvement of political elites 
regrouped in ethnic parties, who transferred ethnic disputes from streets on to 
Parliament, Romania faced a more difficult post-communist transition. As other 
countries from the Eastern Europe, Romania had to face a triple transition. 
Besides rapid economic change and a new democratic institutional design, 
Romania had to put in place a constitutional framework able to accommodate 
minorities. Other countries from the former Soviet Union and former 
Yugoslavia had even a more difficult task, since they had to balance national 
integration and secessionist threats, the legal recognition of the inherited 
borders and the definition of nationhood.
30
 
 
 
Ethnic Tensions and the Expansion of Minority Rights 
 
Once transferred to the Parliament in early 1990, ethnic tensions in 
Romania have been channeled by the disputes regarding the issue of expanding 
                                               
28  Catherine Verdery,  ational Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in 
Ceau escu’s Romania (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995). 
29  Stefano Bottoni, Stalin’s Legacy in Romania: The Hungarian Autonomous Region, 1952-
1960 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018). 
30  Taras Kuzio, “Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple,” Politics 21, no. 3 
(2001): 168-177. 
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minority rights. Despite the nationalist discourse of the Romanian parties in 
government which aimed at consolidating in power,
31
 the inclusion of the newly 
formed Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrată a 
Maghiarilor din România – UDMR) in the political arena and especially its 
access to the Romanian Parliament largely helped to keep open an essential 
communication channel between the two ethnic communities in Transylvania. 
Through their parliamentary representation, ethnic Hungarian political elites 
had the opportunity to defend ethnic minority rights and to take part to the 
overall reshaping of the institutional design put in place by the new Romanian 
Constitution from 1991. The specific institutional design left the room opened 
for the future expansion of minority rights through political and parliamentary 
strategies,
32
 so that there would be no need to resort to overt ethnic struggle, as 
it was the case in former Yugoslavia.
33
 
The initial provisions of important laws on education and public 
administration were rather restrictive with regard to minority rights. The Local 
Administration Act of 1991 stated the supremacy of the Romanian language, 
even in counties and localities where ethnic minorities constituted the majority 
of inhabitants. The law demanded to elected officials to use Romanian, the 
national language, in open debates in local councils, for example, even where 
there was no ethnic Romanian elected official. The same goes with education. 
Following a tense debate in Parliament,
34
 the Act of Education was adopted in 
1995. Although it acknowledged the use of Hungarian and other minority 
languages in primary, secondary and university education, it stated the 
obligation for disciplines as history or geography to be taught only in 
Romanian. This was a clear symbolic constraint, since it was well known that 
ethnic minorities use peculiar, different geographic denominations and that they 
use different perspectives when dealing with various historical events. 
Despite the initial nationalistic perspective on nation-building and 
sovereignty, the willingness of the Romanian political elites to work for 
Romania’s integration into the Council of Europe, NATO and the EU proved to 
be decisive in expanding minority rights. The accession to those regional 
                                               
31  Tom Gallagher, “Nationalism and political culture in the 1990s,” in Post-Communist 
Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition, ed. Duncan Light and David Phinnemore 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 104-124. 
32  Mihaela Mihailescu, “The Politics of Minimal ‘Consensus’: Interethnic Opposition 
Coalitions in Post-Communist Romania (1990-96) and Slovakia (1990-96),” East 
European Politics and Societies: and Cultures (2008): 553-594. 
33  Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito 
to the Fall of Milosevic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002). 
34  Catherine Kettley, “Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romania. The 
Hungarian Minority in Context,” in Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition 
Countries, ed. Farimah Daftary and François Grin (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 
2003), 243-266. 
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organizations represented a serious conditionality, pushing for the consolidation 
of democracy and the consistent expansion of minority rights.
35
 Not only were 
the initial restrictive legal provisions in teaching history and geography lifted, 
but the use of minority languages was accepted at all educational levels, from 
primary school to the university level, with the obligation of teaching and 
learning Romanian as official language. In public administration domain, public 
debates in minority languages in the local councils were accepted with proper 
translation in Romanian and with the final decision and disposition to be written 
in Romanian. The new Public Administration Law from 2001 states that in all 
localities where minorities trespass a 20% threshold, public institutions and 
local authorities can use minority languages when in relation with citizens from 
minority groups. Moreover, public inscriptions are provided in the minority 
language, wherever the minority group trespasses 20% of the population. 
Romania ratified in 2008 the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages and, in parallel, the law for patrimonial restitution from illegal 
dispossession during communism was strictly enforced in Romania. The 
Hungarian community in Transylvania recovered many of the proper conditions 
for the preservation of its native language and of its cultural identity. Through 
the restitution act, both Catholic and Protestant churches of ethnic Hungarians 
recovered large parts of the patrimony they have been dispossessed of by the 
former Communist regime back in 1948. Many of the restituted buildings have 
been put by the Hungarian churches at the disposal of local authorities and 
currently host Hungarian language schools. 
Consistent minority rights area turned Romania from laggard to regional 
leader.
36
 However, expanding minority rights at the very limit of language 
rights also meant passing to a new level of ethnic relations. The fulfilment of 
large cultural rights was considered by the Romanian parties as the ultimate 
definition of what would be a reasonable compromise with the Hungarian 
party’s demands. Since ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania now benefit from a 
large cultural autonomy, based on autonomous and solid institutions, such as 
schools, libraries, churches and numerous publications, voluntary associations 
and foundations, engaging into political negotiations for redefining regional 
design triggered the refuse of ethnic Romanian parties, which led to a long-
lasting status-quo. 
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Symbolic Politics and the Affirmation of a New Region 
 
 With the expansion of minority rights and with Romania’s accession to 
the EU, ethnic tensions entered a symbolic phase. Because the expansion of 
minority rights has attained the very limits of what ethnic Romanian parties 
conceived at the beginning of the post-communist transition as reasonable 
compromises, the deadlock on seriously engaging in negotiating regional 
autonomy for the Hungarian ethnic minority left no room but for the 
development of symbolic politics. Since our aim is to unravel the very 
mechanism laying at the heart of the symbolic affirmation of a new region, we 
extensively focus on the public statements made by various actors in the region. 
By media covering and secondary data analysis, we rely on the positioning of 
relevant public actors as parties and party leaders, local elected officials, 
churches and other cultural associations, in order to set up the framework for 
interaction and the recent developments in the affirmation of this region. 
 In 2007, Covasna county council decided to set up eight tourist road 
signs at the county borders, as to mark the entry into Szeklerland. Similar road 
signs with the text Székelyföld (Szeklerland) were put in place immediately after 
by authorities from the neighboring Harghita county. The two county councils 
are dominated by UDMR elected councilors, since both counties are inhabited 
in large shares by ethnic Hungarians (73.79% in Covasna and 84.61% in 
Harghita). When the Romanian State Road Company removed the tourist road 
signs, the dispute entered a judicial phase, finally won by the two county 
councils. The legal and permanent installation of the signboards with the text 
Székelyföld marks the beginning of a symbolic competing geography over the 
new region. As in other geographical contexts, the dispute regarding road signs 
is a mixture of hot and banal nationalism, which can be better understood by the 
functioning of everyday nationalism.
37
 It means that expanding minority rights 
can initially trigger acute nationalist reactions from the other ethnic side, but 
finally the two communities get accommodated and start using symbolic 
national symbols in everyday contexts. 
 The argument of the Romanian State Road Company was that Romania 
is a unitary state and that there is no official territorial unit called Székelyföld. 
The symbolic affirmation of the presence of ethnic minorities has also been 
contested when other road or street signs have been put in place before. 
Beginning with 1996 and the access of UDMR to several central governing 
coalitions, the expansion of minority rights through tough political negotiations 
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took the shape of redefining public space.
38
 Sharing public space also meant 
accepting extensive public inscriptions in Hungarian (road signs, schools, 
libraries, police stations) in areas inhabited in significant shares by ethnic 
Hungarians. The amended law of public administration has set up in 2001 a 
20% threshold for defining what a significant share of ethnic minorities means, 
but those provisions regarding public inscriptions were unevenly put in place. 
The responsiveness of local elites mainly depended on their political affiliation, 
with UDMR elected officials showing more willingness to implement those 
provisions,
39
 but also on the effectiveness of the local cooperation between 
ethnic Romanian and ethnic Hungarian elites, or on local elites’ willingness to 
accept the influence of central political leadership.
40
 Although many of the 
initial road inscriptions in Hungarian and some of those in Romanian were 
destroyed during night-time, in the end, public inscriptions in minority 
languages have been largely accepted and can be now find all over across 
Transylvania. 
 Street names, flags and commemorations are important symbolic issues 
that help defining identity and belonging. Items as street names stand as identity 
markers and affirm the willingness of ethnic groups to appropriate public space. 
Alongside statues of national heroes, poets and musicians, street names evoke 
past events or personalities and express the ideological dominance of political 
rulership.
41
 They commemorate past events and national heroes, helping to 
strengthen collective identity by various processes of constructing and 
reconstructing history and tradition.
42
 Moreover, the symbolic domination of the 
urban space, as a strategy used by ethnic groups, fits into practical categories, 
classificatory schemes and cognitive frames, as emphasized by Brubaker.
43
 
Alongside the politics of street names in Transylvanian cities,
44
 the use of the 
Szekler flag is an important identity marker. It is visible throughout the region, 
raised on private or public buildings. The current flag, figuring one blue and 
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two horizontal yellow stripes, with a sun and a crescent in its upper left corner, 
was inherited by the region from the medieval coat of arms of free Szeklers. 
The widespread presence of the Szekler flag triggered a dispute regarding 
the right of ethnic Hungarians to hoist this flag. Finally, a law (Law 141/2015) 
was adopted by the Romanian Parliament, granting each territorial unit the right 
to adopt and use a specific flag, but limiting its presence to public institutions’ 
buildings or to special events, as commemorations and other festive events. It 
was the way the Harghita county council adopted in 2015 the historical Szekler 
flag as its own county-specific flag. In fact, the presence of flags was 
symbolically used at the beginning of the post-communist transition in another 
tense context, in Cluj-Napoca city center.
45
 The city was the capital of 
Transylvania during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and was shared for 
centuries by ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians. Although inhabited by a 
large ethnic Hungarian majority before 1918, the city slowly became an ethnic 
Romanian city, and is today inhabited by a Hungarian minority that counts less 
than 20% from the overall city population. The nationalist mayor Gheorghe 
Funar, elected three times on a row beginning with 1992 by a large ethnic 
Romanian majority in town, did everything he could to secure the votes of 
ethnic Romanians and to assert the Romanian character of the city center. The 
city center is dominated, since the end of the 19
th
 century, by the equestrian 
statue of Mathias Corvinus, a famous Hungarian king from the Renaissance 
period. In order to neutralize the Hungarian past of the city, the mayor erected 
towering flagpoles flying Romanian flags on each side of the statues and even 
replaced the white-painted benches in the square surrounding the equestrian 
statues with new ones in Romanian national colors.
46
 
The symbolic affirmation of the new region was strengthened by the 
inclusion of Szeklerland among the Hungarian regions represented in Brussels 
by the Association of Hungarian regions. The Association is a Hungarian lobby 
institution designed to to keep the Hungarian Regional Development Agencies 
in touch with the European institutions. Although the lobby could eventually 
improve the economic situation of the regions represented by the Association of 
Hungarian regions, the official representation of Szeklerland is much telling 
about the willingness of ethnic Hungarian elected officials in Szeklerland, as 
well as of several politicians from Hungary, to strongly affirm the existence of 
the region as distinct from other Romanian regions. This symbolic 
representation is necessary since an administrative region designed in the 
historical limits of Szeklerland does not exist in Romania. 
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The long-lasting status-quo over the territorial design and the advances in 
regionalization triggered a growing internal competition within the ethnic 
Hungarian minority. Since UDMR used the strategy of small steps beginning 
with early 1990s and thus managed to seriously expand minority rights, its 
inability to operate the unlocking of the status-quo on regional design only 
fueled discontent and frustration. In fact, growing symbolic political action and 
the affirmation of Szeklerland could be related to the channeling of this ethnic 
discontent. And this is also visible in the reshaping of the internal competition 
for political representation within the ranks of the ethnic Hungarian minority. 
During the successful process of expanding minority rights, UDMR 
remained the unchallenged representative political party for all Hungarians in 
Romania. With the slowing expansion of minority rights, as they were 
approaching the very limits taken for acceptable by ethnic Romanian parties, 
UDMR slowly began to lose ground when it came to politically represent ethnic 
Hungarians. Therefore, new Hungarian parties emerged, as the Hungarian Civic 
Party (Partidul Civic Maghiar – PCM) and the Hungarian Popular Party in 
Transylvania (Partidul Popular Maghiar din Transylvania – PPMT), alongside a 
National Szekler Council (Consiliul Național Secuiesc – CNS), a civic 
organization aimed at politically representing Szeklers from Transylvania. With 
a stronger appeal towards a territorial reorganization based upon bottom-up 
initiatives and regional identities,
47
 PCM and PPMT managed to won several 
important mandates in local elections. In 2016, for example, both parties won 6 
mandates each in county council elections held in Covasna and Harghita 
counties.
48
 The twelve mandates were subtracted from the total number of 
mandates previously won by UDMR in those counties. This loss is important 
when one notices that the total number of seats in both Covasna and Harghita 
county councils is 31. 
In fact, the increasing electoral preferences for both PCM and PPMT 
could be related to the symbolic affirmation of the Szeklerland. Noticing the 
reluctance of UDMR to engage into more substantial and tough symbolic 
politics due to governing coalition constraints, PCM and PPMT seized the 
opportunity and proposed in 2009 and 2012, by the voice of ethnic Hungarian 
elected deputies in Parliament, several draft bills regarding the autonomy of 
Szeklerland. Although those drafts have been rejected by all Romanian 
parliamentary parties regrouped in an ad-hoc coalition, smaller ethnic 
Hungarian parties managed to put the issue of regional autonomy on the 
parliamentary agenda. Moreover, PCM and PPMT also put pressure on UDMR 
as parliamentary party, which proposed a new draft bill on the same matter in 
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February 2018, rejected by the Parliament in May 2018. This represents a 
different approach for UDMR, noticing that previously the Hungarian party was 
pleading for a special status for ethnic Hungarians, namely personal autonomy 
and a special status for the Hungarian language, therefore rather focusing on 
cultural, individual and collective rights then on explicit territorial autonomy. 
The 2004 draft bill proposed by UDMR was postponed several times and finally 
rejected in 2012 by the Romanian Parliament. 
Because smaller Hungarian parties are not parliamentary parties, they adopted 
a different strategy than UDMR. For instance, CNS used the legal provisions for 
citizen initiative and prosed in January 2017 a new draft bill regarding the autonomy 
of Szeklerland. But the most important initiative undertaken by CNS is the 
referendum organized in 2008 in numerous communes and towns within Szeklerland. 
The referendum, organized by civic associations and not taken for legal by the 
Romanian government, was put in place in order to offer support to the citizen 
initiative and the new draft bill concerning the regional autonomy. The referendum 
was backed by numerous ethnic Hungarian elected mayors, as well as by many town 
and commune councilors. The result of the referendum was subsequently invoked in 
January 2017 by the authors of the citizen initiative. Those initiatives are highly 
symbolic, aiming at underlining region’s distinctiveness and turning autonomy from a 
taboo into an partially acceptable, although controversial issue. By invoking similar 
autonomy arrangements from other European Union member countries, as South 
Tyrol in Italy, as well as the principle of regional democracy, ethnic Hungarian parties 
managed during the recent period of time to put forward several draft bills and to 
force ethnic Romanian parties to discuss, although briefly and sporadically, about 
asymmetric autonomy and collective minority rights. With the ongoing tensions in 
other autonomous regions from Europe and especially in Catalonia, the pressure on 
Romanian parties will increase, most probably forcing them to look for a negotiated, 
solid and long-lasting solution. 
 
 
Territorial Design and Regional Autonomy for Szeklerland 
 
As mentioned earlier, Szeklerland is neither an invention, nor a novelty. 
Although Szeklerland has a strong historical tradition, the current symbolic 
affirmation of the region makes it to appear as a new region, mainly because it 
is in deep contrast with the official Romanian regional design. In its effort to 
join the European Union, Romania adopted in 1998 the necessary territorial 
regulations in order to cope with the statistical requirements of the European 
Commission, namely a series of NUTS 2 territorial units.
49
 The eight new larger 
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units, presented in Figure 2, have been designed as development regions, 
coordinated by regional development agencies and placed under the supervision 
of a central government regional development ministry. The move was rather 
limited to the creation of statistically functional regions, as the central 
government refrained from devolving consistent competences to those new 
development regions.
50
 Regions are not legal persons in Romania and cannot 
work as political and administrative actors. They cannot directly access EU 
funding, but only can do this through the Ministry of Regional Development 
financial schemes. Although the new development agencies managed to 
inoculate to local authorities the logic of regional development, the overall 
results of the regional policy in Romania are rather weak. 
Moreover, development regions did not replace the existing smaller 
territorial units, the 41 existing NUTS 3 territorial units, called județe 
(counties). Counties are the largest territorial units to be recognized by the 
Romanian constitution from 1991, and their presence firmly states Romania’s 
character of national and unitary state. The difficulty in abandoning the county 
as the largest territorial unit and the reluctance of the central government to 
empower regions could only partially be explained by central government’s 
fears of boosting existing development disparities,
51
 accelerated recently by the 
free market logic of private competitiveness and investment. The most difficult 
obstacle for effective regionalization is the ethnic symbolic conflict in 
Transylvania and the affirmation of Szeklerland. 
The obstacle was present from the very beginning, when it came to draw 
the boundaries of the development regions, but in a rather attenuated manner. 
Taking into account technical elements, the first law on regional development 
(Law 151/1998) regrouped existing NUTS 3 units (județe) into larger NUTS 2 
units, namely into eight development regions. The criteria which drove the 
regrouping of the existing counties into larger statistical units were the potential 
cooperation between counties, the human capital diversity and socio-economic 
heterogeneity.
52
 By doing this, the central government endowed each region 
with highly developed and under developed areas, expecting that more 
developed, leading areas work for the development of those areas that lagged 
behind. Moreover, the rather technical discussions regarding regional design 
were exempt of the subsequent ethnically symbolic dimension. With less room 
for identity issues, the 1998 political negotiations were almost ethnically 
neutral. The regionalization was top-bottom oriented and it was the result of 
consulting a very limited number of actors.
53
 
                                               
50  Ana Maria Dobre, “Designing and Justifying Regional Reforms: Lessons from Romania,” 
Policy and Politics 36, no. 4 (2008): 587-600. 
51  Dragoman, “Regional Inequalities, Decentralization and the Performance.” 
52  Dumitru Sandu, “Social Disparities in the Regional Development and Policies of 
Romania,” International Review of Social Research 1, no. 1 (2011): 1-30. 
53  Benedek and Bajtalan, “Recent Regionalization Discourses and Projects.” 
50  DRAGOȘ DRAGOMAN, SABINA-ADINA LUCA, BOGDAN GHEORGHIȚĂ 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XX  no. 1  2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The obstacle related to the identity and territorial shape of Szeklerland 
became more and more evident with each subsequent push towards deeper 
regionalization. With a frustrating long-lasting status-quo regarding regional 
design, the cooperation potential of governing multi-ethnic party coalitions in 
central government got seriously eroded. It is worth to mention that expanding 
minority rights was the main basis of the coalitions formed earlier by UDMR 
and several Romanian parties in power or in opposition.
54
 With minority rights 
expanded at the limit of negotiated solutions, the dead-lock in expanding 
regional autonomy for ethnic Hungarians alongside ethnic lines channeled the 
tension towards the increasing symbolic affirmation of Szeklerland. 
The tension was quite visible in 2011, with the willingness of the central 
government to reshape regional administration in a quick and profound manner, 
by turning the existing development regions created in 1998 for mainly 
statistical reasons into functional regional units. Seizing the opportunity to 
redraw the regional map by imposing a more salient ethnic vision, UDMR 
proposed to split the existing development regions in two, raising their number 
from 8 to 16, and to regroup them into five macro-regions, as shown in Figure 
3. By this, UDMR would have gained more ethnically homogenous 
development regions than it is the case today. The new regional design would 
have detached Covasna, Haghita and Mureș counties, inhabited in large shares 
by ethnic Hungarians, from other counties, largely inhabited by ethnic 
Romanians (Alba, Brașov and Sibiu). 
The coalition partners, the Democrat Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat 
Liberal – PDL) offered instead a special status for Harghita and Covasna 
counties as forming a distinct region for the future, alongside the current eight 
development regions. Extracting Harghita and Covasna counties from the 
current Development Region 7 (Center), although appealing, would have left 
behind the Mureș county into a region dominated by ethnic Romanians. With 
growing internal party tensions and serious criticism from smaller ethnic 
Hungarian parties, UDMR rejected the offer. The failed attempt to redraw the 
regional map finally kept in place the long-lasting status-quo on the regional 
design issue, fuelling the frustration of the two ethnic camps. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The symbolic affirmation of Szeklerland as a new region in Europe is in line 
with developments in Spain and the United Kingdom, where referendums for 
autonomy and independence have been recently organized. However, the situation 
is different for Szeklerland. The region has not yet attained the level of recognition 
enjoyed by autonomous regions or by regions in quest for wider autonomy. 
Therefore, the article emphasizes the mechanisms for symbolic differentiation and 
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affirmation put in place by ethnic Hungarian elites on external and internal settings, 
alongside symbolic responses from ethnic Romanians. 
 On a theoretical ground, organizing the empirical material and deriving 
implications from the observation on the ground, the article points toward a 
different understanding of the use of symbolic politics. It is here the escape 
route taken by normal politics, based on party negotiations, when the deadlock 
on sensitive ethnic issues is impossible to overpass. Therefore, symbolic politics 
channel elite behavior in a context marked by both ethnic tensions and a rather 
consolidated democratic setting. With overt violent confrontation removed from 
the range of possible actions, banal, every-day nationalism based on highly 
relevant symbols is to be noticed. By other means, symbolic nationalism fulfills 
the same duty, namely marking the territorial boundaries of ethnic groups and 
assessing their dominance. In the same time, the symbolic conflict works for the 
internal cohesion of ethnic groups and legitimate the predominance of political 
elites. 
 Hosting Szekleland in Brussels alongside other Hungarian regions, 
under the common umbrella of the House of Hungarian Regions, which is a 
Hungarian lobby institution, is a step taken by ethnic Hungarian elites for 
increasing the awareness about the region. This symbolic external act completes 
the effort for differentiation on internal grounds. The symbolic affirmation 
ranges from road signs and signboards marking the entry into Szeklerland, to 
the widespread presence of Szekler flag and coat of arms, commemorations and 
other public gatherings. Moreover, ethnic Hungarian parties from Transylvania 
affirmed the existence of the region by expressing the inhabitants’ willingness 
to live in a distinct regional unit through a local referendum and several draft 
bills in the Romanian Parliament regarding the autonomy of the region. 
 The increasingly symbolic affirmation of the region signals the escape 
route for long term ethnic tensions and frustrations on both ethnic sides. For 
ethnic Hungarians, asymmetrical regional autonomy would be the best 
guarantee of minority rights, by removing ethnic rights from the threat of 
uncertain and frustrating political negotiations inside successive governing 
coalitions. For ethnic Romanians, a possible asymmetrical territorial autonomy 
should be disconnected from the process of expanding minority cultural rights. 
All ethnic Romanian parties rejected the draft bills regarding the autonomy of 
the region put forward by ethnic Hungarian deputies. Regional autonomy along 
ethnic lines is in deep contrast with the organization of the Romanian unitary 
state. Such an autonomy would surpass full cultural rights and turn into 
collective territorial rights. However, it is the expansion of cultural minority 
rights at their limits, combined with the permanent deadlock on reshaping 
regional design, which seems to fuel the current symbolic affirmation of 
Szeklerland as a new region in Europe. Although limited to a single case-study, 
the article could be the basis for a future broader comparative analysis of 
symbolic nationalism and political elite behavior in other disputed territories in 
both East-Central and Western Europe. 
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Figure 1. Counties in Romania. 
Source: Created by the authors. 
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Figure 2. Development regions in Romania. 
Source: “Eurostat: Romania remains with five regions among the poorest 21 in the EU,” 
actmedia, February 29, 2016, accessed May 13, 2020, https://actmedia.eu/daily/eurostat-romania-
remains-with-five-regions-among-the-poorest-21-in-the-eu/62520.  
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Figure 3. The reshaping of the regional design proposed by UDMR. 
Source: “Acad. Dinu C. Giurescu,” Formula AS, No. 966, 2011, accessed May 13, 2020, http://arhiva. 
formula-as.ro/2011/966/spectator-38/acad-dinu-c-giurescu-13646.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
